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The possibility of violence is ubiquitous in human social relations; its forms are manifold and its causes complex. Different types of violence are inter-
related, but in complex ways, and they are studied within a wide range of disciplines, so that a general theory, while possible, is dif"cult to achieve. 
This paper, acknowledging that violence can negate power and that all forms of social power can entail violence, proceeds on the assumption that the 
organisation of violence is a particular source of social power. It therefore explores the general relationships of violence to power, the signi"cance of war 
as the archetype of organised violence, the relationships of other types (revolution, terrorism, genocide) to war, and the signi"cance of civilian-combatant 
strati"cation for the understanding of all types of organised violence. It then discusses the problems of applying conceptual types in analysis and the 
necessity of a historical framework for theorising violence. The paper concludes by offering such a framework in the transition from industrialised total war 
to global surveillance war.
Conceptual and Theoretical Frameworks  
for Organised Violence
Martin Shaw, Department of International Relations, University of Sussex, United Kingdom
A general theory of violence is a large demand. If the pos-
sibility of violence is ubiquitous in human social relations, 
its forms are manifold and its causes complex. What appear 
as general theories of violence o!en concern, in reality, a 
speci"c, even if broad, range of violent practices. Neverthe-
less di#erent types and contexts of violence are o!en related 
to each other. For example, Charles Tilly (1982) classically 
investigated positive connections between warmaking, 
organised crime and state formation. And more recently it 
has been noted that sexual violence has become widespread 
in armed con(icts. However relationships between di#er-
ent types can be negative as well as positive. )us Anthony 
Giddens (1985) saw the “paci"cation” of societies by nation-
states leading to the “extrusion” of violence from domestic 
societies into the international system. )is in turn in-
creased internal paci"cation in some contexts: for example, 
violent crime levels in British society were far lower during 
the Second World War than in the subsequent period of 
peace. )ese interconnections of forms of violence that are 
generally seen as categorically di#erent raises the possibil-
ity of a general theory, but they are di+cult to encapsulate 
in simple generalisations. Moreover any survey of violence 
in human society is surely likely to show that the forms 
and incidence of violence are historically variable, so that 
the most fruitful level of conceptualisations and theories 
may not be transhistorical, but speci"c to certain historical 
periods.
1. Violence, Power and Politics
)e most general theorisations o!en concern relationships 
with power. Violence is o!en conceived as the expression or 
extension of power, as in Carl von Clausewitz’s classic dic-
tum that war “is the continuation of political intercourse by 
other means” (Clausewitz [1832] 1976). Yet Hannah Arendt 
(1970) seminally argued that violence is a negation of power, 
properly conceived. Of course, it can be argued that power 
has “two faces” (and maybe more) and that Clausewitz and 
Arendt are talking about di#erent aspects of power, the 
“zero-sum” and “cooperative” respectively. Violence may 
be an expression of the antagonistic exercise of power, but 
work in opposition to its cooperative exercise.
Clausewitz’s axiom suggests that the most important type 
of socially organised violence is speci"cally connected to 
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political power, but little re(ection is needed to recognise 
that violence is possible within the context of all major 
power types. )us Mann (1986, 1993) distinguishes four 
“sources” of macro-social power: economic, ideological 
(which subsumes cultural), political and military. To these 
we may add another which is more commonly exercised at 
a micro-level, namely familial (although in some cases – 
monarchies, "nancial dynasties, etc. – this may be tightly 
connected to the four macro-types which Mann identi"es). 
It is evident that all "ve forms of power may be contexts of 
violence, as well as of cooperative social relations that con-
tain violence. Yet it this is not equally true of all "ve types: 
military power is speci"cally concerned with the manage-
ment of violence, and (if Clausewitz is right) political power 
has, in general, a tighter relationship with military power 
than have economic, ideological or (for that matter) familial 
power. Indeed Mann is unusual in recognising military 
power as a major type in its own right; more commonly it is 
subsumed within political power in this order of theory.
However these "ve types of power vary considerably in 
their forms and relationships through history – indeed the 
distinction of “the economic” and “the political”, etc., is 
a speci"cally modern idea. Likewise the relationships of 
these power types to violence also vary. )e connection of 
politics and war, for example, was clearly tightened with 
the rise of the modern nation-state and its achievement, in 
some cases, of something like the monopoly of legitimate 
violence with which Max Weber ([1922] 1964) classically 
credited it; the relationship was di#erent in earlier epochs. 
Moreover this relationship had transformative implica-
tions for all the other types of violence: as the state came 
closer to being what Giddens (1985; following Weber) calls a 
“bordered power container”, violence was “squeezed out” of 
economic relations, which came to be centred on what Karl 
Marx called the “dull compulsion” of the market mecha-
nism. Indeed, insofar as Weber was right about the state’s 
“monopoly”, violence was subdued, or at least regulated, 
not only in economic but in cultural and familial relations. 
Modern nation-states, a!er all, go so far in eschewing vio-
lence “internally” that in many cases they have renounced 
the right to execute citizens even for crimes like murder. 
Although none have so far renounced the right to prosecute 
war, many smaller and weaker states, especially within the 
North Atlantic alliance and the European Union, have de 
facto ceded their warmaking capacities to alliances and 
more powerful states.
One of the themes of recent scholarship is that the conven-
tional Weberian notion that states claim a “monopoly” of 
legitimate violence is inadequate (Mann 1993; Shaw 2000). 
According to Mann, it overstates the exclusivity of legiti-
mate violence to the state – he reformulates latter’s de"ni-
tion more (exibly as “(1) a di#erentiated set of institutions 
and personnel, (2) embodying centrality, in the sense that 
political relations radiate to and from a centre, to cover a 
(3) territorially demarcated area over which it exercises (4) 
some degree of authoritative, binding rule-making backed 
up by some organised political force” (Mann 1993, 55). And 
of course much recent study (e.g. Kaldor 1999) focuses on 
forms of violence involving irregular armed groups, which 
re(ect the increasing failure of states in much of the world 
to achieve anything near the classic monopoly of violence – 
even states that are not viewed as “failed” o!en have to deal 
with other organisers of violence. Although this violence is 
o!en called “political”, it is clearly entwined with economic 
and cultural (e.g. ethnic) themes, so that the continuing 
relevance of this kind of labeling may be at least partially 
questioned. )ese developments only stress the complex-
ity of the challenge of developing a general theory even just 
to cover modern social violence. )e di+culty of this task 
is only compounded by the fact that the academic study of 
violence is carried out in specialist "elds (e.g. gender stud-
ies, criminology, strategic studies, security studies, political 
sociology, history, law, etc.) which o!en have little contact 
with each other.
2. War as the Archetype of “Political Violence”
In the remainder of this paper my approach will therefore 
be to attempt a systematic analysis of the area that we can 
(while acknowledging the di+culties just mentioned) provi-
sionally call political violence, within which I have reason-
ably broad expertise, and explore more provisionally some 
of the ways in which the argument might be extended from 
that base. I argue that before we can approach a theory of 
violence we need a conceptual framework which encapsu-
lates some principal types, so allowing us to pose the ques-
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tions of relationships while acknowledging the di#erences 
that have been commonly recognised.
Although violence is explicitly or implicitly accepted in 
many areas of social relations, Arendt’s argument that it 
dissolves social power is profoundly relevant. However 
much violence can be seen as reinforcing some kinds of 
power, it is always in some sense a disruption of social 
relations and cooperative power, and a means of harm to 
individuals or groups. Because of this, the way in which it 
is studied is generally a#ected by the tensions that violent 
practices produce. )is is as true of the conceptual as of the 
theoretical and empirical terrains. Concepts are o!en con-
troversial: thus many scholars are unhappy with the ideas 
of “terrorism” and even “security”, because of the ways they 
are implicated in o+cial political-military discourses; while 
the application of the “genocide” label is o!en problematic 
because of its moral, legal and political overtones. Because 
of this, scholars o!en resort to relatively neutral concepts: 
“con(ict” instead of “war”, “political violence” instead 
of “terrorism”, “ethnic cleansing” (a perpetrator-derived 
euphemism) instead of “genocide”, “humanitarian crisis” 
(surely oxymoronic) instead of all of these, and so on. It is 
argued here that “terrorism”, “genocide”, etc., do have viable 
meanings and we should avoid euphemisms. We need to ex-
tricate the concepts from the ideologies within which they 
are o!en contained, and we need to de"ne them in coher-
ent ways which are not illegitimately loaded with political 
meanings.
In fact, even the blander, apparently euphemistic terms 
may also have rational cores. Con(ict is a!er all a central 
category of sociology, and had long been recognised as such 
in Max Weber’s sociology, and the “con(ict sociology” of 
the late 1950s onwards (e.g. Dahrendorf 1959). Social rela-
tions of all kinds entail con(ict, but con(ict is not gener-
ally or necessarily violent. “Con(ict” becomes euphemistic 
only in relation to violence: for when con(icts move from 
“normal” social and political antagonism into the realm 
of violence, their meaning and dynamics change in very 
signi"cant ways, and this requires conceptual recognition 
which simple reference to “con(ict” seems to deny. “Armed 
con(ict” is more useful because it di#erentiates violent 
con(ict from social con(ict in general, but still seems an 
analytically blunt term because it lacks the coherent de"ni-
tion and theorisation that has been o#ered for “war”, “geno-
cide”, etc. )e idea of “political violence” is less established 
– Clausewitz, for example, would not have recognised such 
a term because he believed that politics made violent could 
be described as war. )e term is also problematic precisely 
because the movement from politics to violence is always 
fraught and contested. Yet it seems useful because so much 
violence develops in relation to politics, and “political vio-
lence” provides an overall description of the "eld which can 
encompass a range of particular forms. Yet no more than 
“armed con(ict” does “political violence” have a coherent 
de"nition, let alone theorisation. Both of these terms may 
be employed, as I have used the latter here, when we wish 
to indicate a broad "eld including diversity of action and 
con(ict, but not when we really wish to pin down, describe 
and explain what is going on.
)us it is the speci"c terms (“war”, “genocide”, etc.) which 
actually capture speci"c types of relationship and are most 
analytically useful, if not necessarily so easy. Although the 
assimilation of politically directed violence to war may 
appear increasingly problematic, “war” remains a compel-
ling central term for this "eld. For this reason I begin with 
war, and I shall explore other concepts mainly in relation 
to this pivotal idea. )e centrality of war is historically very 
deep and should not be avoided. It is in war that violence 
has been broadly legitimate for thousands of years, and as 
states have tended to monopolise legitimate violence, the 
contrast between the legitimacy of international war and 
the illegitimacy of violence in a domestic context has grown 
and grown. )e increasing political paci"cation of northern 
industrial societies has sharpened this tension: despite the 
chronic low-level violence found in the larger cities of West-
ern industrial societies, the gulf between this and the vio-
lence of the wars that Western states wage in other places is 
huge. In many parts of the non-Western world, on the other 
hand, the synergies of war with other forms of violence, e.g. 
organised crime, urban gang con(ict, are o!en striking.
Clausewitz’s theorisation of war remains seminal for the 
modern understanding of the phenomenon. Although 
his aforementioned axiom can be, and has been, read as a 
reduction of war to politics, so enabling the easy incorpora-
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tion of violence within political logics, its deeper signi"-
cance lies in the “otherness” of the means that war o#ers for 
realising political goals. Clausewitz views war as at once a 
type of action carried out by a single (but of course col-
lective) actor, and a type of con!ict between two (or more) 
actors, in which the action of each is conditioned by that of 
the other. While politics in general could be characterised 
in similar terms, it is war’s character as violent con(ict 
which determines its distinctiveness. Although war is 
fought for political objectives and may be limited by them, 
war reconditions those objectives through the medium 
of violence. Whereas politics in general is concerned with 
renegotiating power between actors, the violence of war 
leads actors to seek to destroy the other’s power. Whereas 
political contests in general involve the indeterminacy that 
goes with reciprocal action, the reciprocity of violence is es-
pecially open-ended and unpredictable: “there is no limit to 
an act of force”, Clausewitz argued, presenting escalation as 
a general tendency of war. )e generalisability of this view 
of war is wide. While Clausewitz himself presents war as 
normally an activity of states, the logic of his arguments ap-
plies to armed con(ict even where the actors are not states 
(guerrilla war is treated by him as a variant, “small war”).
Clausewitz was what is now called a strategic theorist, 
concerned with the options for commanders in the practice 
of war. However the strength of his theorisation is partly 
due to the broadly sociological treatment that he o#ers, 
both in his presentation of war as a type of social action 
and con(ict, and in the ways he deals with the relationships 
between war and other types. )us he famously compares 
war to commerce, comparing the moment of “realisation” 
of military preparations, organisation and activity, namely 
battle, with the moment of realisation of commercial activ-
ity, namely exchange. )e logic of violent con(ict makes 
battle a rare event, messy and unpredictable, compared to 
the frequency and regularity of the moment of exchange 
in markets. )is has all sorts of consequences for war as a 
social activity: for example, Mary Kaldor showed that West-
ern weapons systems had become increasingly “baroque” 
in the decades a!er 1945, because they had mostly not been 
tested in battle (1982).
)e model of war presented by Clausewitz is best un-
derstood as an ideal type, in the sense later advocated by 
Weber, and the ways in which real wars relate to this vary 
considerably. Clausewitz himself recognised that both the 
character of the political objectives and the circumstances 
in which war was fought could a#ect the intrinsic tendency 
towards escalation. )us although there was a tendency for 
war to become “absolute”, in reality “friction” due the con-
ditions in which it was fought would prevent it producing 
complete, mutual destruction. He was writing, of course, 
before the industrialisation of war (generally dated from 
the mid-nineteenth century) enabled war to become far 
more destructive (MacNeill 1982). In the twentieth century, 
“total war” became the dominant form, with total mobili-
sation of economies and societies leading to increasingly 
total destruction. Moreover nuclear weapons threatened to 
abolish traditional types of friction (constraints of geog-
raphy, climate, etc.) and enable instantaneous, complete 
destruction of a kind which Clausewitz could only regard as 
hypothetical.
Contemporary armed con(icts are of course mostly much 
more limited than the total wars of the mid-twentieth 
century, or the nuclear war threatened by the arsenals of 
the Cold War. Certainly many con(icts vary so much from 
the ideal type that it has been argued that war today is 
“post-Clausewitzian” (van Crefeld 1991; Kaldor 1999). Few 
wars are between states; they o!en seem to be concerned 
with controlling economic resources and expelling “other” 
ethnicities rather than destroying other power centres; and 
they rarely seem to be resolved by the decisive violent mo-
ments, or battles, that were central to the traditional model. 
Violence appears not to be about destroying the enemy’s 
power, but seems to be embedded in more limited instru-
mentalities connected with the private interests of com-
manders and "ghters.
3. War and Revolution, Terrorism, Genocide
I shall return to this transformation of warfare, but only af-
ter reviewing other types of political violence that have been 
theorised. I shall argue that although other types have o!en 
been conceptualised and theorised more or less indepen-
dently from warfare, their speci"city as forms of violence is 
best grasped in relation to the classic concept of war. 
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We begin with revolution, which of these is the one most 
clearly regarded as a political form of violence. )e classical 
model of revolution, based on the French Revolution of 1789 
and adopted by nineteenth-century revolutionary theorists 
as well as in(uencing social and political historians in the 
twentieth century, is one in which violence plays a second-
ary role. Revolutions are mass social upheavals of largely 
unarmed civilian populations seeking social and political 
transformation, although they also involve revolutionary 
parties and organisations which are sometimes, to a greater 
or lesser extent, armed organisations.
In this classical perspective, most forcefully argued by Leon 
Trotsky in his History of the Russian Revolution ([1932] 
1965), violence is the byproduct of more fundamental social 
processes. According to Trotsky, organised violence is 
necessary only in the "nal seizure of power (which follows a 
fundamental shi! in the balance of forces achieved by more 
organic movements of the masses which themselves involve 
only limited, spontaneous violence), and then only because 
of the organised resistance of the old order. Trotsky high-
lights the relatively small death toll even in this "nal stage 
(in the Russian case, the Bolshevik seizure of power). Of 
course, this perspective is partial, since even in cases where 
violence plays a relatively small part in the revolution itself, 
the threat which it poses to domestic and international 
power relations usually leads to much greater violence. )us 
the relatively low-casualty Russian revolutions of Febru-
ary and October 1917 led to the extensive bloodshed of the 
internationalised civil war which lasted until 1921. While in 
Trotsky’s perspective the onus for this lay primarily on the 
counter-revolution, from an analytical point of view it is 
di+cult to separate the civil war from the revolution which 
gave rise to it. What this case does suggest, however, is that 
when revolutionary processes produce organised violence 
they are best understood under the rubric of war. Clearly 
the later twentieth-century history of revolution deviated 
from the classical model, in that in most cases revolutions 
actually developed as organised military campaigns rather 
than mass social movements: the Chinese case is the princi-
pal model of this new type.
)e problem of terrorism (in historical perspective, a 
relatively minor form of political violence) is another which 
is o!en considered apart from war, but which ultimately 
needs to be assimilated to the military framework. )e 
reason for the o!en-made analytical separation is that ter-
rorism is correctly understood as symbolic politics, rather 
than serious military coercion. Terrorist methods involve 
terrorising civilian populations, usually through publicised 
killings of a number of civilians, so as to produce politi-
cal e#ects. Terrorism can therefore be considered a form 
of oppositional politics; but nevertheless, qua violence, it 
represents a negative case of the logic of war. Terrorism is, 
as o!en remarked, the warfare of the (militarily) weak: its 
o!en self-styled, would-be warriors adapt to their military 
weakness by adopting tactics which compensate for their 
inability to in(ict serious military damage by in(icting 
symbolic damage instead.
Genocide is clearly a very di#erent (and historically more 
important) case. Whereas terrorism involves a contest be-
tween organised armed actors (typically, insurgent groups 
versus states), and revolutions involve contests between 
politically organised social movements and states, typically 
leading to armed contests between revolutionary parties 
and states (and hence civil war), genocides are typically con-
ceived as campaigns of organised, armed power (states, re-
gimes, parties, armies, militias) against largely unorganised 
and unarmed populations. Genocide has therefore o!en 
been conceptualised as completely “one-sided” violence (e.g. 
Chalk and Jonahsson 1991), directed at essentially helpless 
victims, and therefore not as con(ict at all. )e problem 
with this characterisation is not only that genocide gener-
ally occurs in the context of political and (usually) military 
con(ict, but also that it generally leads to resistance and can 
thus be conceptualised as con(ict.
Certainly, the qualitative asymmetry between the organised, 
armed character of genocidal power and the militarily un-
organized, unarmed, social power of the attacked popula-
tion is essential to genocide, and di#ers in principle from 
the quantitative asymmetry between non-state and state 
armed actors which is o!en labelled “asymmetrical war”. 
Yet genocide necessarily involves social relationships be-
tween attackers and attacked, and so can be seen as a form 
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(however unequal) of social and political con(ict. Geno-
cidists attack their target groups in ways which anticipate 
resistance (o!en “decapitating” political elites or murdering 
adult men as potential resistance "ghters). Attacked groups 
are never pure “victims”, but always resist: in the cases 
where they are weakest, mainly in constrained forms of ci-
vilian resistance, but usually also, at least to a token extent, 
through armed resistance. )ey will always align them-
selves with armed opponents of their attackers, whether 
armed movements or states. Indeed in many cases genocide 
occurs in the context of armed con(icts, and it can even 
be a mutual attempt of two armed actors to destroy each 
other’s ethnic or national groups. )us genocide can also 
be seen as a deviant form of war, involving a clash between 
armed power and unarmed civilians, which o!en occurs in 
the context of more conventional war and sometimes leads 
to new phases of it.
4. The Centrality of Civilian-Combatant Strati!cation
From the narrow point of view of strategic theory, even 
armed revolution and terrorism are relatively minor forms 
of violence, and genocide is not within the frame. It is 
mainly from a sociological point of view that we can iden-
tify the commonalities between these di#erent types of vio-
lence, and their linkages to the central frame of war. Central 
to both the distinctions and the commonalities between 
the types is the idea of a type of strati"cation common to 
all organised violence, centred on the distinction between 
combatants and non-combatants (or civilians). Mainstream 
sociology has not, of course, recognised this among the 
main forms of strati"cation (class, status, gender, ethnic-
ity, etc.); this absence is a function of sociology’s historic 
neglect, marginalisation and exceptionalisation of war. For 
it is clear that all organised violence produces sharp forms 
of combatant-civilian strati"cation. A!er examining the 
development of this type of strati"cation even in situations 
like anti-Nazi resistance where bonds between civilians and 
armed "ghters are strongest, I argue that this is an irreduc-
ible dimension of all forms of armed con(ict. (Shaw 2007, 
chapter 8).
)is strati"cation is of course institutionalised outside 
periods of actual violence, when a soldier is generally 
identi"ed as a uniformed member of an o+cial armed 
force, and a civilian as non-uniformed or a non-member. 
However, from a sociological perspective the key distinc-
tion is between those who take up arms and those who do 
not, and this distinction is generally reproduced in violent 
con(ict. Certainly, this core distinction needs to be ampli-
"ed to take account of more complex relationships: many 
civilians actually participate in armed forces, both in war 
and non-war, as unarmed or non-uniformed members or 
employees; many more participate in war and war prepa-
rations through employment in military industries; most 
civilians support wars carried out by states or other armed 
organisations that they see as representing their society. Yet 
civilians, as non-combatants, are militarily innocent, even 
if civilian populations are o!en politically implicated in 
violence. An additional key reason for distinguishing them 
from combatants is that they contain the “arch-civilians”, 
young children and the mentally incapable, whose inno-
cence in both senses is unquestionable. It is not possible to 
attack politically “guilty” adult civilians without harming 
these wholly innocent groups who depend on them.
One of the reasons for insisting on the continuing cen-
trality of the war paradigm is that the ways we make 
sociological sense of all forms of political violence consis-
tently employs the civilian-combatant distinction. War 
is combatant-combatant con(ict, in which civilians are 
not, fundamentally, participants (even if they take part in 
secondary ways). Revolution is, classically, a form of social 
movement, and social movements are in principle civilian 
in character; but revolution becomes war when it develops 
from a civilian-state political con(ict to an armed con(ict 
between revolutionary organisations and states. Terrorism 
is a method of armed con(ict characterised by its targeting 
of civilians in order to produce political e#ects. Genocide is 
a type of con(ict characterised by the projection of power 
by an armed organisation against a civilian population: 
although genocide has been o!en de"ned as an attack on 
a particular social group (in the UN Convention, ethnic, 
national, racial, religious; scholars o!en add social classes 
and political groups), what all these groups have in com-
mon is that they can be regarded as fundamentally civilian, 
and this is the most coherent basis on which to de"ne the 
group character of genocide’s targets. ()is civilian charac-
ter of the victims was implicit in Raphael Lemkin’s original 
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de"nition of genocide [1944], but “civilian” has become the 
“missing concept” of genocide studies.)
5. Using the Conceptual Framework to Analyse Violence
I suggest, therefore, that we need to use the conceptual 
framework o#ered by the understanding of war, derived 
initially from strategic theory but developed in a fun-
damentally sociological framework, to analyse political 
violence in general. )is approach cuts across, to some 
extent, the actual tendency of empirical study in the "eld. 
)is is because in the two decades since the end of the 
Cold War, scholars have recognised a shi! from inter-state 
to civil (or mixed) armed con(ict (Kaldor 1999; Du+eld 
2001) – a belated acknowledgement, since even during the 
Cold War most armed con(icts were not between states. 
With this academic shi! there has o!en been a tendency 
to accentuate the novelty of contemporary forms of armed 
con(ict. Within strategic studies this has taken the form of 
the aforementioned emphasis on “asymmetrical wars”, to-
gether with the changing forms of military technology (“the 
revolution in military a#airs”) and organisation (“network-
centric warfare”, etc.) (see Freedman 2006 for an overview). 
Within more sociologically oriented literature, attention has 
focused on the more radical concept of “new wars”, which 
argues that wars like those in former Yugoslavia and Africa 
are “post-Clausewitzian” con(icts of state fragmentation, 
fought by non-traditional armed forces, centred on identity 
politics, utilising global diaspora support networks, char-
acterised by ethnic expulsions and avoiding battle (Kaldor 
1999). Both these literatures stress the role of contemporary 
social changes – technological and organisational change, 
the uneven e#ects of globalisation – in producing changes 
in warfare. ()ey thus suggest that linkages between war-
fare and other forms of social power, from which we started 
above, are central to transformations of violence.)
Clearly the concepts discussed above (war, revolution, 
terrorism, genocide) have the function of ideal types, in 
Weber’s sense, which enable us to analyse concrete his-
torical situations. Because they are ideal types of modern 
political violence in general, they should not be understood 
as standing for a particular historical phase or experience 
of armed con(ict. In this sense, the argument that contem-
porary violence is “post-Clausewitzian” seems misplaced 
partly because it identi"es Clausewitz’s model of war with 
a particular set of contingent factors (statism, mass armies, 
etc.) which characterised the period in which he was writ-
ing, rather than with the core logic of war which he identi-
"ed. And in so far as “new wars” theory argues that the core 
logic has itself been displaced, this is not entirely accurate: 
battle as the realisation of war, for example, which Mary 
Kaldor (1999) argued was replaced by “ethnic cleansing” in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, reappeared in the confrontations of 
the Croatian and Bosnian armies with Serbian forces which 
shi!ed the balance of power in ways which conditioned 
the Dayton settlement of 1996. And of course, Clausewitz 
understood that battle was not necessarily a frequent occur-
rence, especially in “small wars”.
Likewise, the “new wars” argument treats “ethnic cleans-
ing” as novel. Although mass expulsion was certainly new 
to late-twentieth-century Europe, it was commonplace 
in Europe during the "rst half of the twentieth century, 
and widely practiced elsewhere in the world. What was 
novel was partly the terminology: while the expulsions 
themselves could be well understood in terms of genocide 
(at least in the broader de"nitions o#ered by Lemkin and 
the United Nations, even if not in the narrower meaning 
which equated it with total mass murder), there were o!en 
political reasons for avoiding this conclusion. )e events in 
Bosnia and elsewhere involved speci"c combinations of war 
and genocide: executing and consolidating (or preventing) 
genocidal expulsions in order to create ethnically homog-
enous states was the goal of the wars between the various 
new states and statelets that emerged from the break-up of 
Yugoslavia.
Moreover speci"c combinations of war and genocide were 
combined, as Kaldor showed, with new constellations of 
state and non-state political actors, a new political economy 
of war (parasitic rather than productivist) and connections 
with organised crime. What this example illustrates is that 
in order to understand violence, we need both typologies 
of violence and historical theories of all the forms of power 
and their interconnections. Even if contemporary politi-
cal violence does not negate classical concepts of war and 
genocide, it clearly needs to be grasped with an understand-
ing of the intersections of military with all the other forms 
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of power. Although contemporary violent con(icts are still 
in important senses political – even the most blatantly self-
enriching warlords usually dress up their goals in political 
terms and "ght in the name of nationalistic parties – they 
clearly have intimate relations with new forms of economic, 
ideological and familial power. In this sense, a theory of 
violence must address two fundamental agendas: "rstly, the 
types of violence and the particular sorts of social relations 
these involve ( especially between combatants and civil-
ians); and secondly, the intersections of military power 
(organised violence in general) with the other fundamental 
sources of power.
6. Historical Transformations of the  Relationships 
between War and Society
As I suggested above, these agendas need to be addressed 
in a historical framework. If Marxists were right about one 
thing, it was the necessity of historically speci"c concepts 
and theories (Korsch 1963). )e most fruitful macro-sociol-
ogy of the last quarter-century has been the historical soci-
ology of power and the state (e.g. Giddens 1985; Mann 1986, 
1993), with many implications for the study of violence, even 
if it o!en has dealt more with the role of violence (i.e. the 
power context) than the nature of violence (the character of 
war, genocide, etc.).
In my own work (Shaw 1988, 1991, 2005), I have attempted 
to address this weakness by suggesting a historical theory 
of the transformation in the relationships of military power 
(violence) and other forms of social power. To summarise, 
I argue that during the later nineteenth century the growth 
in the infrastructure of industrial capitalism (including the 
“industrialisation of warfare” and the creation of disci-
plined industrial workforces which could be harnessed both 
for military production and in mass armies), the expan-
sion of structural power in imperial nation-states, , and the 
growth of ideological power (especially with the emergence 
of mass media) led to the emergence of a new “mode of war-
fare”. By this I mean a new macro-framework of organised 
violence together with a new set of relationships with other 
forms of power. )e mode of “industrialised total war”, 
which was increasingly realised in the two world wars, saw 
a novel set of power relationships, as the requirements of 
military power increasingly (and especially in periods of 
war) dominated the economic, ideological and political 
life of advanced societies. )is mode of war was generally 
associated with economic statism and with increasing state 
mobilisation of political and ideological life, in some cases 
totalitarian. It dominated throughout what Eric Hobsbawm 
called “the short twentieth century” or “the age of ex-
tremes” (1995).
During the Cold War, however, the mode of industrialised 
total war was already mutating. )e changed international 
system, the outcome of the Second World War, produced a 
di#erent con(ict. As reliance on nuclear weapons grew, the 
total-mobilising side of the military system declined (mass 
armies became less important and conscription began to be 
abolished), even if the total-destructive side was accentu-
ated. With the end of the Cold War, Western (mainly US) 
war preparations changed, leading to a “new Western way 
of war”, just as “new wars” developed in the non-Western 
world. Western governments now aimed chie(y to "ght 
very limited, “quick-"x” wars, within the tight time and 
geographical constraints of the multi-faceted surveillance 
imposed by domestic electoral politics, global media, the 
global "nancial system, international law, the UN and 
non-governmental organisations. Indeed all armed actors 
increasingly faced this new surveillance context: if regimes 
in countries like Iraq or Serbia were to "ght the West, 
they had to compete with the West in the “media war” for 
international public opinion; likewise Western outliers like 
Israel, and the Palestinian armed movements who opposed 
it, had to take account of this context. For movements plan-
ning terrorist attacks, like al-Qaida, global media surveil-
lance constituted an opportunity as well as a constraint: 
a Hollywood spectacular like 9/11 o#ered an unparalleled 
opportunity for a militarily weak organisation to produce a 
devastating political impact.
In general, then, I conclude that industrialised total war has 
given way to what I call the global surveillance mode of war-
fare, as the framework for armed violence of all kinds. )is 
involves not only mutations in the forms of warfare – “new 
wars”, “new Western warfare”, “new global terrorism” – but 
also transformations in the relationships between organised 
violence and social power generally. Whereas in the mode 
of industrialised total war, war tended to dominate and 
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shape politics, economics and culture, in the mode of global 
surveillance war, warfare is greatly more constrained by 
other forms of power: wars have to be fought with an eye to 
their short- as well as long-term electoral, media, "nancial, 
international, legal and other e#ects. )ese constraints are 
internalised, and dictate the timing and parameters of war: 
as I write, the Israeli government is ending a three-week 
campaign of destruction in Gaza (carried out with an eye 
to Israeli elections in February 2009) just 48 hours before 
the inauguration of President Barack Obama. )is theo-
retical framework of the late-twentieth-/early-twenty-"rst 
century transition in the organisation of violence is o#ered 
as a framework for analysis. Within it, much remains to be 
done to grasp the complexity and variation in the forms of 
violence, their relationships with other types of power, and 
the direction of further historical change.
7. Conclusion
)e historical approach proposed in this article has resolved 
the demands of a general theory of violence in a particu-
lar direction. )e most obvious next advance would be to 
further articulate the connections between “political” and 
other forms of social violence in the modern period. )e 
assumption of this paper is that historically speci"c theory 
is the area in which the most meaningful generalisations 
can be made. If this is correct, the task of a general, i.e. 
transhistorical, theory would be to address the nature of the 
macro-historical conditions of change in the role of violence 
in human society.
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